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LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY
IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO COSTA RICA

I.

INTRODUCTION

Along with a proliferation of independent countries in the. Third World
since World War

II has come a proliferation of minimum wage regimes.

Following

the example of the industrialized countries and the encouragement of the In
ternational Labou r Organization, the less developed countries have created
machinery for defining and administering legal minima.

The justifications

offered for such intervention in the wage determination process are the familiar ones advanced in the more deve loped countries . 1 Infue presence of
great poverty, minimum wages are proposed as an ameliorative measure which can
protect wage earners from the depressive influences of competitive or, even
worse, monopsonistic labor market forces on wage levels.

Implicit is a

belief that the labor market cannot be relied upon to yield secularly increasing wage levels either because of the existence of perfectly elastic
labor supply schedules or of unspeci fied "market imperfections" . 2 That a
shift in demand could maximize another professed goal, that of employment,
in the presence of an elastic supply and wage stability seems to be overlooked.

Therefore, aggressively administered minimum wages have been ad-

vocated as a means for rais ing the real incomes of the laboring poor, sharing
widely the fruits of economic growth, and effecting a more egalitarian income
distribution.

In the eyes of many, the existence of legal minimum wage regimes
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and an active administration of these have become an important test of a
government's concern for the welfare of its people, of its commitment to
"social justice".
The intended scope of coverage of minimum wage regulations varies as
does the degree of detailed administration. 3 Initially, many of the regimes
were limited to employments in larger establishments and only gradually
extended to other urban and rural groups . Some countries, including Costa
Rica, have adopted very complicated systems which discriminate among industries, occupat i onal groups, and regions.

The frequency of review and adjust-

ment of minima is often specified by law though adjustment by executive decree
is not uncommon in the face of unusual circumstances such as accelerating
inflati on .
While the statedobjectives with respect to coverage are ambitious,
the results almost universally fall short of their achievement.

In fact,

it is generally agreed that the legal minima a're effective primarily in

the larger establishments in urban areas and in the modern large-scale commercial agricultural sector where workers are also frequently organized in
trade unions.

The degree of evasion increases as one moves toward smaller

enterprises and less urbanized areas,

Indeed, most governments make no

serious effort to enforce the minima in such employments since the administrative agencies

typically are grossly understaffed in relation to the

requirements of such an undertaking.

Furthermore, the-atltoor4-t-ie-s--of-ten-- --·---

concede in private that the legal minima may lie beyond the liability to
pay" of small employers,so that enforcement could result in their elimination.
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There seems to be little disposition in the LDCs to question the desirability or efficacy of legal minimum wages, presumably because they are viewed
as "a good thing" and as a proper instrument of policy for pursuing laudable
objectives.

This essay represents an attempt to examine these premises within

the context of a single small developing country, Costa Rica.

The study of

the evolution of the labor market and the role of minimum wages in determining
ef fe ct; ve wages . ./as undertaken for a peri od of rough ly a decade, from the mi d-l 960s to the
mid-1970,s. 4 During this period, it is possible to distinguish three policy
objecti ves whi ch minimum wage administration was intended to pursue.

The first

was the general objective of promoting the economic welfare of wage and salary
earners by periodic adjustments in the legal minima.

The second objecti ve,

whi ch was manifested particularly toward the end of the studied period, was
the alteration of the distribution of income within the covered labor force
by acti ng on interindustry and occupational minimum wage differentials.
Finally, minimum wages were vi ewed as an appropriate instrument for addressing
the problem of poverty , as a means of altering the income distribution generally in favor of the poor. 5 The efficacy of minimum wages as a policy instrument for achieving these three objectives will be examined in order in the
following sections.

II. MINIMUM WAGES AND THE GENERAL WAGE LEVEL
The decade, 1966-75, is characterized by two sharply contrasting subperiods.
From 1966 through 1972, both money' and real wages rose steadily in the industri al
sector.

(See Table 1.)

Real wages rose at an annual compound rate of 4.8 percent .

Since this rate of increase exceeds that in the economy-wide average producti vity,
which I have estimated to have been about 3. 2 percent, industrial workers would
appear to have improved their economic position relative to other economic groups .6
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Table 1.
Index of Nominal and Real Wages and of Employment in
the Industrial Sector
1968 = 100

Year

Nominal
Wages

1966

84.76

1967

91.24

7.65

94.94

6.41

90 . 85

8.63

1968

100.00

9.60

100.00

5.33

100.00

10 . 07

1969

108.68

8.68

105.82

5.82

111.35

11.35

1970

117.98

8.56 '

108.95

2.96

126.14

13.28

1971

126.81

7.48

114.44

5.04

138.31

9.65

1972

136.92

7.97

118.14

3.23

147.54

6.67

1973

154.09

12.54

119.01

0.74

159 . 49

8.10

1974

189.26

22.82

115.72

-2.76

171 .80

7.72

1975 *

225.70

19.25

111.46

-3.68

167.84

-2.31

*
Source:

Percent
Change

Real
Wages

Percent
Change

89 . 22

Employment

Percent
Change

83.63

January - November only
Banco Central de Costa Rica. The inde~es are derived from data supplied
by the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the national social security
agency. The data are drawn from a sample of 562 industrial firms.

-5-

Unfortunately, however, the eruption of world-wide inflationary forces did not
pass Costa Rica by.

Wholesale prices began to rise rapidly in late 1973 and

continued to do so through the first half of 1974.

Consumer prices lagged behind

the increases in wholesale prices but still managed a 16.3 percent increase in 1974 and another 24.6 percent in 1975.

The crisis was reflected

in a sharp decline in the rate of economic growth.

In per capita terms,

GNP increased on the order of only one percent in each of these two years .
While money wages advanced substantially during this inflationary outburst , they fell behind the rate of increase in pri ces.

Real wages in. the

i ndustrial sector, deri ved from a sample of 562 firms, declined about
"3"; percent in each of the two years so that, by 1975 , average real wages
had f al len back almost to the level prevail i ng in 1970.

In that part of

the private sector covered by the social security system, average real
remunerations declined even faster, by 5. 8 and 5. 3 percent in 1974 and 1975
respectively.

1

To what extent can the observed course of average earn i ngs be attributed to the intervention of public policy measures?

In Costa Rica, the

principal instrument of wage policy is the system of minimum wages which
extends to the private sector as a whole. 8 In addition , the wage policies
pursued by the central government and the various quas i -autonomous public
agencies may have "spillover effects

to the extent that remunerations
there l ead those in the private sector. 9 Prior to 1974, minimum wages
U

were reviewed and revised every other year.

Since then, with the onset of

severe inflation, annual revisions have become the rule .
I do not wish to minimize the difficulty of disentang l ing the i mpact
of various forces which may act on wage levels .

In the absence of rigorous

testing , one is well advised to be cautious in making strong statements
about the sources of causation.

In the case of Costa Rica, an analysis
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of the available wage data provides · strong support for a hypothesis that
revisions in minimum wages have not been the only, and probably not the
principal, determinant of wages in important sectors of the economy.

To

be sure, in the case of some low-wage employments, particularly in agriculture, minimum wages may have caused effective wages to rise faster
than they would otherwise have risen, or at least affected the timing if
not the rate of change of such wages.

With respect to wage levels in the

non-agricultural sectors, however, the available annual and monthly data
suggest that wage levels have been subject to the influence of forces
that have operated independently of changes in legal minima.

For example,

during each of the years in which there was no adjustment made in legal
minimum wages, average earnings in the industrial sector nevertheless
advanced.

(See Table 2)

Indeed, the rate of change in earnings in the

off-years Ci .e., the years of no minimum wage adjustment) was not much
different than that in the on-years, and in some cases exceeded the increases of the latter.

It is quite clear that the increases in earnings

ran substantially ahead of the changes i n the minima even in the years in
which the minima changed,with the possible single exception of 1974.

Even

though in 1968, for example, the rate of change in the average earnings
appears as 9.60 percent and the change in the minimum apears as 10 percent or less, it should be kept in mind that the increased minimum was effective for only th.e final three months of the year.

Thus, if there had

been no wage changes independent of the minimum wage in that year, the
rate of change in average earnings would have been in the neighborhood of
only 2.5 percent for the year as a whole.
This same tendency for earnings to outrun changes in the minimum wage
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Table 2
Rate of Change in Average Monthly Earnings in
the Industrial Sector and in Minimum Wages
1966 - 1976

Year

Average Monthly EarningsRate of Change over
Previous Year

Date and Size of Adjustment
in Legal Minimum Wages

1967

7.65

No adjustment made

1968

9.60

October 1,1968 - 10% or less

1969

8.68

No adjustment

1970

8.56

October 1,1970 - 10% or less

1971

7.48

No adjustment

1972

7.97

October 1,1972 - 7.5 - 15%

1973

12.54

No adjustment

1974

22.82

April 1, 10 - 41%

1975*

20.68

January 1,9.5 - 11%

1976

January 1,8 - 18%

* Average January - November only
Sources: Banco Central, "Indice de Sa1arios del Sector Industrial;" Ministerio de Trabajo, Consejo National de Salarios, "Infonne sobre el
Estado Actual del Sistema de Salarios Mfnimos en Costa Rica".

- 8 -

can also be observed in sectors other than the industrial.

Consider, for

example, the rates of change in earnings and minimum wages over an interval
within which a change in minimum wages was effected.
compare the rate of increase in average

ear~ings

For this purpose we

over the interval June

1972 to December 1973; a change in the minimum became effective October 1,
1972.

In the mining sector, the various minimum wages were adjusted up-

wards by proportions ranging between 10 and 15 percent.

Nevertheless,

average earnings during this period increased by 32.6 percent, a rate more
than double that of the minimum wage increase.

In agriculture, minimum

wages were increased in a range of 7. 5 to 15 percent, yet average earnings
increased by 23.8 percent.
had been effected in June

In construction, for which an interim increase
1971, the 1972 determination increased most

occupations by 5 percent; average earnings increased by 9.2 percent.

In

commerce the margin of increase in actual over minimum wage increases was
much narrower, 15.2 to 12-13 percent.
Differences in the rates of adjustment in these two wage variables
carryover into the inflationary years 1974 and 1975.

For example, the

construction industry,wh;ch was enjoying a boom ,saw wages rising faster
than average minimum wages applied to the sector.

In April 1974, increases

in minimum wages applied to the sector ranged between 20 and 30 percent.
Average earnings in December 1974 stood 27.4 percent . above the level of
the previous December.

In 1975, the increase in the legal minimum amounted

to 10 percent; however, average earnings advanced by 22.2 percent.

Appa-

rently, the strength of market forces sufficed to give a substantial upward impetus to wages in that industry.

In 1975, the agricultural sector

also recorded a larger increase in average earnings than that effected
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in the minimum wage.

Whereas the minimum increased by only 11 percent,

actual earnings increased ,by 22.3 percent.

We have no explanation for this

large difference, though we note that during the previous year, actual
wages increased by 20.7 percent, a rate considerably less than the adjustments in agricultural minimum wages which ranged from 25 to 41 percent.
It is possible that the sector lagged in adjusting to the large increases
of 1974 with some part of these "spilling over into 1975.
ll

Unpublished monthly data for the whole private sector based on wages
reported to the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social are

availabl~

and per-

mit us to observe the immediate impact of changes in mi nimum wages as well
as the course of wages on a month-to-month basis.

It is quite clear that,

between 1973 and 1976, the introduction of a change in the minimum wage
has had only a minor immediate or direct impact on wage levels in the
private sector.

(See Table 3)

For example, in 1975, the new minimum wage

went into effect on January 1 with increases ranging from 9. 5 to 11 percent.

Yet in January, average earnings in the private sector increased

by only 1.83 percent.

However, they continued to increase steadily during

the year, so that by the end of December they had ri sen an addi ti ona 1 16.3
percent over the January level .

In January 1976, minimum wage increases

of 8 to 18 percent were promulgated.

Yet in that month, reported average

earnings actually declined slightly in relation to December levels.
after, average earnings can be observed rising again .

There-

In April they

stood 6.8 percent above the January level.
Indeed, in all of the years for which we have monthly data, it can be
observed that average earnings consistently tended upward over the year
both before and after the introduction of a new minimum waqe.

The course

- 10 -

Table 3
Index of Monthly Earnings in the Private
Sector 1973 - 76
(July 1971

= 100)
I n d e x

Month

*

1973

1974

1975

1976

Ja nuary

124005

134.41

168.82

193.95

February

121.58

130.23

166 .1 6

193.19

March

126.13

133.27

162.90

198.51

April

124.61

146.77

175.10

207.06

May

"126.32

151.90

175.10

June

124.24

149 . 81

171.48

July

123.10

153.04

181. 18

August

126 .1 3

154 . 94

177.42

September

129.36

158. 17

184.07

October

128.22

163.12

186 . 73

November

129.93

162.55

183.69

December

133.35

165 . 78

196.42

Annual Average

126.42

150.33

177.42

* Months in which a change in the minimum wage became
effecti~e " are underlined~

Source:

Caja Costarricense de Segura Social, unpublished data.
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of earnings recorded here thus suggests that minimum wages probably have
played a minor role in propelling wages upward.

A stronger case can be

made for the proposition that labor market forces dominated.

Note, for

example, the impressive rate of growth in industrial employment recorded
in Table 1.

Between 1966 and 1973, employment expanded at an annual

rate of 9.7 percent.

Over this same interval, GNP grew at an impressively

high rate of 6.75 percent per annum, one which supported a high rate of
absorption of the growing labor force.

In spite of levels of unemploy-

ment which might appear high by some subjective standard, some classes of
labor were clearly in short supply during the expansive years of the 1960s
and '70s. 10 Employers reported that pirating of experienced labor was a
common practice during this period, lending support to a conclusion that
market forces were actively bidding up the price of labor.
It is noteworthy that government officials with whom I spoke attriI~

buted to minimum wage administration a more important influence on earnings
than the data would seem to indicate.

However, my assignment of a lesser

role to minimum wage administration is supported by other research on the
course of minimum wages in Costa Rica.

On~

minimum wages from 1954 to the mid-1970s. 11

study traced the course of
From the data presented it

appeared that minimum wages in most categories were adjusted upwards at
a rate only slightly greater than the rate of inflation and well below
the rates of increase in national productivity and actual average earnings.
What the Costa Rican experience suggests is that, under conditions of
steady and rapid growth, market forces do assert themselves and can exert
upward pressure on the general wage level, at least in the urban sectors of
employment.
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In judging the impact of legal minima on agricultural wages, one is
on l ess solid ground, for extensive wage data over time are lacking.

Never-

theless, it seems probable that the minima do playa greater role in determining these than wages in other sectors .

For example, it was commonly

believed that , except for the organized banana-producing sector, the legal
mi nima represented the maximum rates paid to the bulk of the agricultural
l abor force .

In addition, evasion of the lega l minima was bel i eved to

be fa i rly widespread in agriculture, lending support to the view t h.at the
minima lay above the ma r ke t pri ce of l abor . Minimum wage administration
duri ng the decade 1963-73 treated the various agricu l tural sub- sectors i n
a di scriminatory fashion .

While the real value of the minima in coffee

and cocoa was either unchanged or actua l ly declined, in the other branches
of the sector except bananas, the annual rates of increase were positive
and on be order of 1. 3 to 2 percent . To the extent that the minima represented actual wage levels of agri cultural workers , th i s would imp ly
that urban-rural earnings differentials widened over the decade . 11
III . MINIMUM WAGES AS A REDISTRIBUTIVE MECHANISM
WITHIN THE COVERED LABOR FORCE
We noted above that one of the stated objectives of minimum wage administrati on in Costa Rica was the narrowing of income inequality .

To th i s end,

differential rates of increase in minima could be applied to high and low-wage
occupational or industrial classes.

According to Delgado and Mora , mi nimum

wages were administered in a way intended to narr"Qw inter i ndustry and i nter occupational differentials from 1954 on. 13 Lower minima tended to be adjusted
upwards at a slightly faster rate than high minima .

Whether these intentions
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were realized with respect to occupational earnings cannot be determined,
for earnings data by occupation are not available over time.

However,

such a policy could hope to effect a narrowing only if the legal minima
for high-wage skilled classes of labor (or applicable to high-wage industries) are already above the opportunity cost of workers so employed.
the market wage for

suc~

If

employments exceeds the legal minima, as appeared

to be the case in parts of the industrial sector, there is no reason to
expect that actual earnings differentials would conform to the structure
of minimum wages.
In 1974, following the onset of inflation, the degree of discrimination applied in the adjustment of minima increased sharply.

Rather than

promulgating increases for all covered employments in approximately the
same proportion in accordance with past practice, administrators applied
a wide range of rates of change with the size of the adjustment inversely
related to the level of the minimum in effect during the preceding period.
Futhermore, the government ;urged firms whose employees were not directly
affected by the legal minima to adhere to a similar discriminatory policy
of wage adjustment.

The disparity in the proposed rates of adjustment was

very large indeed, ranging from 41 percent for the lowest rates to 10
percent for the highest.
of graduated increases.

Two justifications were offered for the policy
First, while wage restraint was considered de-

siraBle as an anti-inflationary measure, it was felt that the lowestincome groups had been hardest hit by the sharp rise in prices of basic consumption items and should not be asked to sacrifice their already low
living standard.

Thus a heavier burden of restraint would have to be
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applied to higher-income groups.

Second, a narrowing of wage differen-

tials wasviewed asadesirable step towards the realization of the governmentis objective of reduced income inequality in the society.
While the principle of larger increases for the lowest-wage workers
was said to have been widely supported, even among the high-wage earners
who were discriminated against by the policy, it is likely that such support will tend to erode in the face of continuing inflation.

In the case

of Costa Rica, employers reported that the continued deterioration in the
real income position of the higher-wage workers led to increased pressure
from them to adjust their wages upwards.

If employers generally respon-

ed to these pressures, this might explain the large excess in the rate
of advance in average earnings over the change in minimum wages during
1975. In that year, legal minimum wages were increased by 9.5-11 percent .
Yet average earnings in the private sector increased during the year by
18 percent . A lagged adjustment to the

shar~lY: '

graduated wage adjust-

ments of the previous year may provide at least a partial explanation
for this large divergence in the two rates of change .
There are surely limits to the effectiveness of graduated minimum wage
changes as a tool for narrowing wage differentials.

Indeed, had the

graduated differentials introduced since 1972 really been effective in determining wage differentials, these would have been narrm'led substantially
and would have inflicted a very sharp reduction in the real wage of the
higher-\,/age worker.

Table 4 illustrates what would have happened to the

relationship between the wages of two o.ccupational groups which stood in
the ratio of

2.5~· 1

" t
t 14 .
prior to the promulgation of the 1972 wage a dJUs
men.
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Table 4
Extreme Rates of Change in Legal Minimum Wages
and Their Hypothetical Effects on
Occupational Differentials
Sept. 1972
Extreme rates of
change in minimum
wages

1972-74

1974

1975

1976

7.5-15%

10-41%

9.5-11%

8-18%

Value of lowest minimum wage (in colones)

13.04

15

21.15

23.48 27.71

Value of highest minimum wage (in colones)

32 .60

35.05

38.56

42.22 45.60

2.5

2.34

1.82

Ratio of highest to
lowest

1.80

1.65

"

Source:

Calculations based on information contained in each year's Decreto
de Salarios Minimos (San Jose: Consejo Nacional de Salarios).
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The table assumes that the larger percentage change in each year applied
to the low-wage job and the smaller change to the high-wage occupation.
The table then chronicles the wage paid in each year.

The accumulated

effect of the graduated increases on the size of the occupational wage
differential is impressive even within the scope of four short years.

~rom

a ratio of 2.5:1 in 1972, the differential shrinks by a third to 1.65.

The

change in the real value of the two wages is strikingly different in the
two cases.

While the value of the lowest minimum wage rose by approximately 6.2 , percent that of the highest actually fell by 30.5 percent. 14
The assumptions under which this calculation was made were of course
rather extreme, and it does not seem that, in practice, the extreme
permissible rates of change were actually consistently applied.

However,

there were many industries in which a significant compression of minimum
wage differentials was effected.

A number of industries in which nar-

rowing occurred are listed in Table 5 along with the ratio of the highest
to the lowest minimum wage for the industry in each of two years, 1973 and
1976.

The lowest rate was that assigned to a production or related worker

(e.g. "peon ") thus omitting the minimum wage applying to custodial personnel.
As can be seen, in some of the included cases, the shrinkage in the diff2rentials was substantial.
The impact of this discriminatory policy on the real value of occupational minimum wages can be appreciated better by reference to the
summary data for 96 occupational titles which appeared in both the 197072 and 1976 revisions.

These were classified into unskilled, skilled, and

other occupational groups, though I emphasize that the classification is
only a rough one, one suggested by the occupational titles appearing in

- 17 Table 5
Ratio of the Highest to the lowest legal Minimum Wage
in Various Industries) 1972 and 1976
Ratio of the Highest to the lowest Minimum Wage

Industry ·

July. 1972

January 1976

Fine cookies and crackers

1.66

1.35

Bread

1.80

1.55

Macaroni products

1.50

1.33

Breweries

1.43

1.25

Shoes (machine-made)

1.27

1.16

Tailors

2.31

1.69

SaMllills

1.44

1.27

Furniture and woodworking

1.65

1.39

:'rinting

3.40

2.30

Rubber

1.95

1.54

Machinery

1.76

1.45

Sugarmills and refineries

1.39

1.24

Candy

L35

1.22

Textiles

1.21

1.15

Soap and detergents

1.21

1.13
- -- '-' -

- -' -

Tanr'leries

1.18

1.15

Electrical products

1.42

1.28

Construction

1.63

1.36

Railroads

2.30

1.75

Source:

"' - - " -- -

Calculations based on information contained in eachyegr's D;recto
de Salarios M;n;mos.
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the decrees.

The "other" category appl i es pri nci pa lly to "other produc-

tion operations workers" ("otros trabajadores de proceso") which suggests
a range of production operations usually characterized by low-or semiskilled occupations.

Table 6 presents the number of occupations in each

skilled classification reporting increases or declines in their real minimum
wage.

As can be seen, few of the skilled occupational titles escaped a

reduction in their real value, while the reverse was true for the unskilled
and semi-skilled titles.

Of the 30 skilled occupations, 20 suffered de-

clines in excess of 10 percent.
One may wish to question the wisdom of pursuing an explicit policy
aimed at narrowing occupational wage differentials further.

After all,

such differentials are generally believed to perform an economic function.
that of providing a return on the cost of acquiring a higher level of skill
or of attracting into skilled employments persons with the personal and
educational qualifications deemed desirable for skilled workers but who
qualify for a broader range of employment opportunities,including some outside the manual category.

To the extent that high-quality workers are

desired in skilled occupations, itwill be necessary to offer wages which
are comparable to those paid in other manual or non-manual fields requir.. ing a similar quality of labor.

The arbitrary definition of narrower mini-

mum wage differentials than those which would be consistent with this
objective would seem to be misguided.

Indeed, as suggested above, market

forces will tend to mai ntai n the wi der di fferenti a1s as long as the exi sting legal minima applicable to the higher-wage employments do not exceed
the opportunity cost of the workers occupying them.

If it is an objec-

tive of national wage policy to effect a narrowing of differentials because high-wage workers are believed to receive large economic rents, a
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Table 6

Number of Occupational Categories with Increases or
Delines in the Real Value of Their Minimum Wage
1972 - 1976

Number and Change in Real Value
Total
Increases
Decreases l
Occupations

Small

Large

Unskilled

38

33

2

3

Skilled

30

2

4

24

Other

30

22

2

6

.1.

A decrease was classified as small if it did not exceed '5 percent large,
if it did.
.. .

Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Consejo Nacional de
Salarios, SalariosMinimos, various years.
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more effective response would be to encourage an increase in the supply
of persons possessing the requisite skills.

This would involve the iden-

tification of the occupations or employments yielding economic rents and
a concerted effort to facilitate access to training.

In addition, it

would imply a measure of restraint on any other institutional forces like
collective bargaining which might, by administrative means, try to preserve the wider rent-yielding differentials.
One final test of the redistributive effects of the government's
policy of graduated adjustments in minimum wages is possible .

I have

compared the interindustry wage structure within the manu f acturing sector at two points in time, December 1971 and November

1975.

(See

Table 7. ) If the graduated wage policy had actually achieved the objective of narrowing wage differentials, we would_ expect to find a negative
correlation between the rate of "'/age change over the two points in time
and the original level of average earnings by industry.

While the data

do yield a negative correlation coefficient of -.276, it is statistically
significant only at the 10

p~rcent

level.

In fact, the extremes of the

interindustry wage structure actually widened over the period.

The ratio

of the highest-wage to the lowest-wage industry increased slightly from
2.64 to 2.74.

However, the variance among the 25 industry groups as measured

by the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to
the mean) declined slightly from 27.8 to 26.1 percent.

Thus, overall, it

cannot be said that the policy objectives had been realized to any apprecia6le extent by the end of 1975.

-21Table 7
Monthly Average Earnings by Industry
December 1971 and November 1975

Monthly Earnings - Colones
Dec. 1971
Nov . 1975

Industry
Food Products
Beverages
Tobacco
Textiles
Clothing except footwear
Leather. footwear, &other
accessories
Footwear except rubber &plastic
Wood products except furniture
Furniture &accessories except
metal
Paper &paper products
Printing &Pub1ist-1ng
Industri al chemic.i';s
Petroleum refi:! ; ~ry:
Petroleum & c:uG~ ~ roducts
Rubber produc:~
?lastic prodl::ts ::et el sewhere classified
Porcelian wares &tiles
Glass &glass products
Other non--meta11fc mineral
products
Basic metals
Metal products except machinery
Machinery, except electrical
Electrical machinery & apparatus
Transportation equi pment
Other manufactures
"

Average

Percentage
Change

698.4
1,170.2
1)298.0
615 .4
56Z.2

1,136.5
1,430.6
2,140 . 4
966.0
868 .3

62.7
22. 3
64 . 9
57.0
54.4

491.2
532.8
542.8

781.3
829 . 5
857 .3

59.1
55 .7
57.9

611.6
768.7
850 . 5
1,069. 9
1,269 . 9
628.3
903 .9

859 . 1
1.461.5
1,315.2
1.640 .2
1.664.6
877.4
1,340 .7

40.5
90.1
54.6
53.3
31.1
39.6
48.3

684 . 5
724 .4
SOO.5

1.177.7
1 ,504.8

1,141.1

72.1
107.7
42 . 5

650.7
704. 7
764.8 874.6
784. 8
853.3
617 .0

1,109. 4
1,515.2
1,1 53.6
1,257. 1
1,528. 4
1.421.4
1,038.4

70.5
115 . 0
50 . 8
43 . 7
94.8
66.6
68.3

734.8

1,156.1

57 . 3

Source: Data provided by Banco Central de Costa Rica . The original source is the
Caja Costarricense de Segura Social .
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WAGES, POVERTY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INr.OMF

One of the objecti ves of wage policy that had been enunciated in Costa Rica
was that of achieving a reduction in poverty and in the degree of inequality
in the distribution of income among social classes.

Before we can discuss the

efficacy of a wage policy for this purpose, it would be advisable to consider
t he interrelationships between wages, poverty and income distribution in order
to determine the contribution t hat a wage

po~icy

might make to a realization

of the stated objectives .
It is tempting to assume that a close relationship exists betwwen the wage
level accruing to individuals and the level of economic well being of that person and his

famil~.

That is, it is frequently assumed that a low level of wages

;s necessarily indicative of poverty or conversely, that poverty is a function
of the wage earned .

A moment ' s reflection, however, should make clear that the

relationship between a wage and a state of poverty is not so simple.
a function of more than just the wage accruing to an individual.

Poverty is

While a wage

or a rate of earnings is associated with an individual, the concept of poverty is
associated with the well being of a household or family.
or absence of poverty is dependent

As such, the presence

not solely on the earnings of any particular

member of the household but on the number of wage earners and their earnings,
other non-wage sources of income, either in cash or kind, and the number of persons in the household unit .

Thus, given the existence of differences among house-

holds in the number of income recipients per household , one would expect differ:
ences to exist between the distribution of individual earnings and that of household incomes.

Let us then consider what can be known about the conditions asso-

ciated with the distribution of income in Costa Rica.
Unfortunately, the data that
are limited in quantity.

are available and also relevant for our purposes

Nevertheless, I believe that enough useful observations

-23can be derived from the available data to permit us to comment on the efficacy
of wage policy as an instrument for dealing with poverty and for redistributing
income.
Perhaps the most extensive study of income distribution is that of Lic.
Victor Hugo Cespedes which is based on a special survey, national in scope, of
households undertaken in 1971. 6 While it does not undertake an analysis of the
relationship between individual incomes and family incomes, it does provide
some information relevant to our inquiry.

First of all, average family incomes

of urban residents are 2.1 times greater than those of rural residents, 1,703 to
796 col ones ' per month . 7 Within the rural sector t here appears to be no di fference between the average family incomes of those families with heads engaged in
agriculture and those with heads engaged in other non-agricultural employment.
Unfortunately, the distribution of families over the various income categories
is not presented on a rural -

~rban

of employment of the head of family.

basis but rather on the basis of the sector
However, some notion of the differences in

the pattern of distribution as between the rural and urban sectors can be gained
from the data presented by sector of employment in Table 8.
As can be seen, low family incomes are more frequently found among families
headed by persons employed in dgriculture than by persons employed in any other
sector. Fully 40 percent of the families headed by a person employed in agriculture enjoyed a monthly family income of less than

~500/or

about U.S. $75, in 1971 .

In no other sector of employment of a head of household did more than 17.5 percent of the families fall into this lowest income category.

Since this latter

percentage includes rural non-agricultural families, it cannot be taken as a guide
to the proportion of urban families in this income category. We can derive a crude
estimate of the proportion of urban families in this income category if we assume
that the distribution of family incomes of the rural non-agricultural families is
identical to that of agricultural families. IS Following this, procedure we derive

-

----------------------

-------------- -

-
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Table 8
Distribution of Families by Family Monthly Income
Level and Sector of Employment of the Head of Family

Sector of Employment of Family Head - Percentage Distribution
Monthly
Income

(Col()ne~l

Total

Agriculture

Totals (Absolute)
Totals (Relative)

2,965
100

1.010
100

Less than
499
500
799
800
999
1000 - 1299
1300 - 1499
1500 - 1999
2000 - 2499
2500 - 2999
30.00 - 3499
3500 - 3999
4000 - 4499
4500 or more
Average Fami ly
Income
l.

2.

25.9%
24.0
10.7
11. 9
5.9
8.2
4. 5
2. 6
2. 0
1.1
0.9
2.3
1,175

39.8%
26.8
9.5
10.3
5.1
4.5
1.2
0.8
0.9
0. 5
0.3
0.3
173

Servi ces
494
100
15.8%
17.2
9.3
15.0
5.7
10.5
8.1
5. 1
2. 6
1.6
3.4
5.7
1,624

Commerce

Construction

Transport
and Communi cations

Mi sc. 1

Others 2

341
100

217
100

165
100

144
100

44
100

490
100

17.5%
26.4
14 . 7
13.8
5. 9
8.2
5.0
3. 2
1.2
0.9
0. 9
2.3

11.6%
20.2
10 .1
12 . 6
8.7
13 .4
7. 2
5.8
3. 6
2.8
0. 4
3.6

7. 9%
32.7
15.8
13.3
10.3
9.1
4. 9
2. 4
0.6

9. 7%
23.5
14 .6
15.3
4.2
17 . 4
4.1
1.4
4. 9
2.1

13.6%
29.5
2.3
18. 2
9.1
11.4
6.8

1.2
1.8

2.8

2.3

1, 203

1,401

Manufacturing

1,213

1,539

6.8

1,372

33.5% N+=22.0
10.2
8.4
4.9
7.8
5.5
2.1
2.2
1.2
0.2
2.0
1,056

Mines and quarries, electricity, water, and activities not adequately specified.
Includes female household heads and others who are not in the labor force.

Source:

Victor Hugo Cespedes S., Costa Rica : La Distribucio'n del Ingreso y el~onsumo de Algunos Alimentos,
op. ci t. , Appendix Table 4, p. 114 .

-25an approximate proportion of urban families with incomes of less than

~500

of

only 6. 5 percent.
Returning to the data in Table 8 once again, we note that almost as
poorly off as families in agriculture were those households headed by a
woman or with no active labor force members - the category identified in
the table as "others".

Such households reported incomes about 25 percent

greater than the average for agricultural households but below those reported by families employed in all other sectors . As in the agricultural
sector, families in this category were disproportionately represented in
the lowest income group.
then

Indeed, of all the families with incomes of less

per month, those in agriculture and with an inactive head of house-

~500

hold accounted for fully three-fourths, while all of the families in these
two categories represented barely half of the total sample of the study.
This concentration of poverty among households headed by a person classified
as "other or by one employed in "agriculture, or more generally among rural
ll

households, should be kept in mind in any policy initiatives intended to
reduce poverty or reduce income inequality among households .
Among the interesting findings of this study is that self-employed
workers reported a family income distribution virtually identical to that
of salaried workers.

This is contrary to a commonly prevailing belief

that the self-employed sector represents a repository of low-productivity,
low-income workers who form a disproportionate part of the population in
poverty. 19
A more precise indicator of poverty is one which takes income per household member rather than income per household unit as a measure of well beingo
Given the finding that family size is larger in rural areas than in urban,
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and that family size seems to be inversely related to level of family income,
i t should not come as a surprise to find that the gap in per capita income
between the rural and urban areas is even greater than that in fami ly incomes . 20
Whereas urban family incomes are 2. 1 times the rural, income per capita was
2.3 times greater.

Fully 77 percent of rural families reported per capita

i ncomes below ~200 per month; only 37 percent of the urban families did so . 21
Fi nally, the study by CeS'pedes provides some insight into the relationship between family incomes and the level of education of the head of household.

For our purposes, it would have been preferable to relate the level

of education to the individual wage earner or income recipient.
such a tabulation is not provided by this study .

Unfortunately

However, to the extent that

it can be reasonably assumed that the head of household is the principal wage
earner of the family and that the level of education of other employed members
of the family is significantly correlated with that of the head, the information provided may be useful .

As expected, within both the urban and rural areas,

there is a clear and direct relationship ,between the level of education of the
head of household and the level of family income.

As can be seen from Table 9,

incomes of the low-education families 'are higher in urban than in rural areas,
but relative to the average income in each sector , the poorly educated urban
families are worse off .

The "significance of the relationship between income

and education is as follows.

If it can also be assumed that the same relation-

ship exists between the earnings of an individual wage earner and his education,
then there may be limits to the extent to which wage policy can improve the
income position of the poor possessing little formal education .

To the extent

that the wage received is an accurate reflection of the productivity of the
poorly-educated person, an attempt to raise his wage may have the effect of

- 27 Table 9
Average Family Monthly Income by Educational Level
of the Family Head and Area of Residence
(Colones)

Average Monthly Income by Area
Educational Level
of · Fami1~ Head
Total

Total

Metro~o'itan

Urban 1

Rural

1,175
637

1,846
772

1,.463
920

796
603

971

1,315

1,248

784

Secondary

1,695

1,860

1,728

1,322

University (incomplete)

2,823

2,920

2,653

2,710

University (completed)

5#255

5,458

4,282

7,777

Other and vocational

2,378

2,874

1,872

1,704

Not known

1,701

2,455

1,422

631

None
Primary

1.

Excludes the metropolitan San Jose area.

Source:

Cespedes S., Ope cit., Table 4. p. 41
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rendering him unemployable.

Unskilled labor is a class of service which is

easily replaceable by machines both in industrial as well as in

~any

types of

agricultural employment.
The 1973 Census of Population provides a basis for verifying and confirming the assumption made above for purposes of relating individuals'
remunerat:ion to their education.

As expected, the incidence of low in-

. comes is clearly related to low levels of schooling completed.

For example,

fully 69 percent of those with no schooling and 54 percent of those with
uncompleted primary schooling earned in comes of less than

~400

per month.

Of those with incomplete secondary schooling, only 23 percent earned less
than that amounto 22
The greater incidence of low wages in rural than. in urban areas implied
by Cespedes' report is confirmed by other sources as well.

The population

census of 1973 clearly found the incidence of low remunerations , ( less
than¢400 a month

to be greater in rural employments

0

For example, of all

men employed .in Costa Ri ca who recei ved 1ess than that amount, 81 percent
are rural residents, while the rural male labor force represents less than
60 percent of the total.

While wages in agriculture are generally low in

comparison to urban wages, nevertheless there appear to exist some significant differences in wage rates and income among the various regions of the
country.

One study of three regions, Vertiente Atlantico, Pacifico Sur, and

Pacifico Norte, found a significant difference in daily earnings of agricultural workers due more to differences in the number of hour.s worked than in
hourly earnings.

(See Table 10)

Indeed, the latter appears to have a

very close relationship to the lowest minimum wage for the dominant agricultural activities of the respective regions. 23 One implication of these
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Table 10

Hourly Wage Rates, Hours l~orked, and Daily Wage Income
of Agricultural Workers in Three
Regions of Costa Rica, 1974

Region

Vertiente
Atlantica
G

Pacifico Sur
•
Pacifico
Norte

Source:

Hourly Wage
Rate

Daily Hours
Worked

Daily Wage
Income

2.75

7.6

20.85

2.30

7.3

16.80

2.40

6~ 1

14.60

IFAM, Ope cit., p. 39 .
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observations is that effecting a change in the wage rate may be of less
importance for lifting poor agricultural workers out of poverty than the
provision of more hours of work. 24
I also explored more generally the extent to which low levels of
earnings were a function of short hours Qfwork. The Census of Population
provides us with some insight into this question.

Clearly the problem of

short hours is considerably more important for men than for women and in
rural areas than in urban.
of short hours among men and

Table 11 provides a measure of the incidence
women earning less than

e400

per month.

Short hours prove to be a contributing cause of low earnings for a significant minority of the wage-earning male population in rural areas .
Almost a third of those with incomes below
than 41 hours per week.
threshold would

e400

worked for wages fewer

Obviously to raise such workers over some income

require more than just an increase in wage rates.

It

should be pointed out, however, that in the case of rural workers. wage
p10yment may not be the only source of -family income.

em~

To the extent that

they also engage in subsistence farming with different frequencies in these
three regions, the differences in wage earnings reported here would not provide a reliable guide to the total income accruing to any particular worker.
Finally, a few additional insights can be

gained f rom tabulations

based on the results of a household survey of income and expenditures made
in 1974 .

This survey was undertaken among urban families only.

As i ndicated

earlier, total family income provides an initial basis for identifying foci
of poverty.

Table 12 provides a summary of some of the in formation extracted

from the survey.

One of the more notable observations is the small number of
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Table 11
Distribution of Wage Earners Receiving Less than t400 per Month
Who Worked 40 or Fewer Hours per Week
by the Number of Hburs Worked

Proportion of Workers Earning Less than t400 who Worked
Less than
25 Hours

25-32
Hours

33-40
Hours

Total Working
less than
41 Hours

TOTAL - 172,359

3.2

4.1

15.9

23.2

Men

- 121,167

2.9

5.0

20.6

28.5

Women -. 51,192

4.1

2.0

4.8

10.9

TOTAL - 115,756

2.9

5.0

21.1

29.0

Men

2.6

5.5

23.8

31.9

4.5

2.3

6.8

13.6

Number of Workers

RURAL

- 97,725

Women -

18,030

Source:

Censo de Poolacidn 1973, Volume II, Table 65, p. 482
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Table 12
Distribution of Income by Family Units
in Urban Areas of Cost Rica - 1974

Average Monthly Income
Monthly
Income
(col ones)

Number
of
Families

Number
of persons
per family

Number of
employed persons per family

500 or less

186

4.1

0. 81

314

77

379

501-1,000

640

4.5

1.2

766

169

655

1,001-1,250

304

5.5

1.5

1,136

206

743

1,251-1,500

289

5.3

1.6

1,373

260

837

1,501-1,750

252

5.8

1.9

1.626

282

847

1,751-2,000

237

5.5

1.7

1,885

340

1,129

2,000-2,500

307

5.7

1.9

2,245

392

~,1 94

2,501-3, 000

246

5.8

2. 1

2,740

471

1,337

3,001-3,500

157

5.8

2.0

3,251

564

1,659

3,501-4,000

135

5. 8

2. 0

3,756

652

1,841

4,001-4,500

87

5. 6

2.2

4,231

757

1,906

4,501-5,000

66

5.9

1.8

4,774

910

2,713

5,001-5,500

40

7.2

2. 2

5,230

732

2,345

273

5.3

1.8

9,620

1,815

5,404

5.3

1.6

2,500

470

1,527

5,501 or more

3,219

TOTAL
All families
(Averages)
Source:

per
per
per
fami 1y
capita employed
(colones)
person

,

Unpublished data, Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Comercio, Direccion
General de Estadlsticas y Censos.
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families in the lowest income stratum, that of under

per month.

~500

The

proportion of all urban families in this income group, 5.8 percent, is comparable in its general order of magnitude with our estimated 6.5 percent of
Cespedes' urban sample for 1971. It also reaffirms our earlier statement
that extreme poverty is more a rural than an urban phenomenon.
Perhaps the most striking observation about the family income distribution i s i ts close relationship to the number of persons per household who
are employed.

Thus , family income increases steadily wi th the number of

workers up to a level of approxi matel y
the number of workers per household
2.

varie~

and over ..

Thereafter,

only within a narrow range around

Notable i s the small numbers of employed workers in the poorest house-

holds .

In the cottom stratum, there is fewer than one or .8, employed per-

son per household.

Some of the households with no employed members may

represent households of retired person.
ed

. ~2t5 00

pe rs~ns

However, there were also 26 unemploy-

present among the 186 households in this income class, though we

have no way of knowing how many of these were parts of households without
any other employed member.

The next lowest income stratum,

~500

- 1,000 also

reported a small number of employed persons per household , barely 1..2" as well as
79 unemployed members i n the 640 households . The incidence of unemployment
is cl early heavier in these two lowest-income categories than in the higherincome families . While the families in these categori es account for 25.7
percent of the total, they account for 33.1 percent of the unempl oyed .
In contrast with the findings reported by Cespedes , this urban survey
indi cates that income per family tends to overstate the degree of poverty i n
the lower- income families in relation to families in other income strata .

- 34;-

The reason for this is the existence of a positive relationship between the
level of family income and the number of family members.
group reported an average of only 4.1 members .

The lowest-income

Thereafter, family size in-

creases along with family income, levelling off at about 5.8 members per
household at an income level of ~2,000 - 2,500 per month. 25 Thus, per capita
differences in income are narrower than those in family incomes.

Further-

more, the differences in the remunerations per employed individual are narrower
still . To illustrate, consider two income classes, that with income under
t500 and that with t2,001 - 2,500.

Average income per family in the latter

is 7.14 times that in the former, income per capita is 5.1 times, while income per employed person is 3.15 times greater .
sons per household is 2.36 times greater.

The number of employed per-

On the other hand, the number of

unemployed persons per household is 1.56 times greater in the lower-income
category.

V.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the observations made in the sections above several conelusions follow regarding the efficacy of minimum wages as an instrument for
influencing the general wage level and the distribution of income.
1.

During a period in Costa Rica characterized by high and steady

rates of economic growth and generally favorable labor supply conditions,
wage levels also rose steadily.

The evidence suggests that the wage policies
I

pursued by government, as expressed through minimum wage administration, had
only a marginal impact on the advance in wage levels .

Labor market forces
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appear to have been the dominant source of pressure on wages. 26 Furthermore, the gains of economic growth appear to have been distributed quite
widely, at least over the non-agricultural sectors for which wage data are
available.
2.

In the Costa Rican environment, minimum wages would appear to-

represent an indiscriminate instrument for effecting a reduction in the
degree of inequality in the distribution of income.

The limited relevant

information at my disposal suggests that an aggressive administration of
minimum wages would be likely to have a much greater impact on the incomes
of the non-poor than on the poorest groups in society.

There are three

reasons for expecting this to be the case:
Fi rst, because poor nousehol dshave fewer members emp.loyed than do
the non-poon either because of unemployment among household members or an
inactive labor force status.

Furthermore, those with the

lowes~

incomes

tend to have a larger proportion of part-time wo rkers among them, i.e., those
working fewer than 40 hours per week.

Therefore, an attempt to raise the

poor out of poverty through general increases i n minimum wages is less likely
to achieve this objective than it is to increase the incomes of non-poor
families with multiple or fully employed wage earners .
Second, because the lowest-income households are disproportionately
distributed in rural areas where the enforcement of mini mum wages is weakest.
Since minimum wases are most easily evaded i n rural employments, the incomes
of the rural poor are less likely to be affected by an increase in the minima
than are those of urban workers who already occupy a more favorable positi on
in the distribution of incomes by households.

-:;&-

Third, because the lowest-income households, and particularly the
rural poor, are characterized by low levels of formal education, they may
be perceived as unqualified for employment at wages signficantly above
their market-determined wage.

Thus, the establishment of high minimum

wages may serve only to block the access of the poor to covered employments and thus contribute little to the achievement of a more egalitarian
distribution of income.
The attempt of public policy to effect a redistribution of in-

3.

come within t he wage ear ni ng group by the application of graduated rate?
of minimum wage change cannot be dismissed unequi vocabl y as unsuccessful.
However, it seems likely to me that this policy had at most , only a temporary effect on the distribution on income.
tional

differenti~ls

redistributive

To the extent that occupa -

tended to be reestablished, though with a lag, the

effect~

of

to be largely dissipated .

~he

inital graduated changes could be expected

This is likely to be a reasonable expectation ,

particularly in a case such as this where the minimum wages applicable to
the hi"gher-wage occupations lay below the opportunity cost of those
occupying them.
4.

This paper has not considered an additional way in which an ag-

gressive minimum wage policy might have perverse effects on the incomes
distribution.

To the extent that such a policy were to result in a sub-

stantial increase in the price of labor relative to the price of capital
goods which may be substitutable for labor in production ,the displacement
of labor might be expected to follow with negative consequences for employment.

In particular, low-skilled labor is likely to be subject to easy
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substitution both in agricultural as well as non-agricultural employments.
Widespread displacement of labor in rural areas would pose particularly
difficult problems of aQsorption in the absence of rural alternative
sources of employment.

And to the extent that the workers displaced possess

very limited amount of human

capit~l,

their chan"es of obtaining urban employ-

ment at the legal minimum wage would be reduced.
Indeed, one i s tempted to speculate that the favorable evolution of
employment conditions in Costa Rica over the decade studied might be rel ated to the observation that minimum wage administration did not appear
to have created significant distortions in the price of labor, at least
in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy.

While the price of capi-

tal does appear to have been maintained below its social opportunity cost,
at least this source of distortion in the relative prices of labor and
capital was not further magnified by effectively raising wages above their
market-determined ievels.

Unfortunately, I am in no position to render an

informed judgement on wage-employment relationships in Costa Rica.

However,

the favorable evolution of the labor market there does pose an interesting
question about the possible contribution made by the restrained policy
followed in the administration of minimum wages over most of the studied
period.
I believe that the evidence presented here supports the conclusion
that minimum wages are not likely to prove an effective ihstr.ument of income
redistribution in favor of the poorest groups in Costa Rican society.
Since alternative instruments are available to the government which
are also potentially more efficient, I would suggest that the burden
of effecting changes in the distribution of income be shifted to these. 27
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International Labour Office, Minimum Wage Fixing and Economic Development (Geneva: 1968, pp. 5-9)
2. This view overlooks the theoretical implications of monopsony. If the
employer is a monopsonist and faces the entire upward-sloping labor
supply schedule, (increases in demand for labor supply schedule), increases
in demand for labor must be followed by increases in wages, though, of
course, the wage will lie below the marginal revenue product of labor.
On the other hand, if the supply of labor schedule facing the monopsonist is perfectly elastic in the relevant range, the employer will have
no effective monopsony power over the wage.
3. Ibid., pp. 77-122.
4. The findings reported here are drawn from a broader study undertaken
by the author as a consultant to the International Labour Office's
Programa Regional del Empleo para America Latina y el Caribe (Regional
Employment Program for Latin America and the Caribbean). A statement
of some of the findings appears in I . L.O. - PREALC, Salarios, Precios
y Empleo en Coyunturas de Crisis Externa. Costa Rica 1973-75 (Santiago,
1 e:
apter
5. These objectives were consistent with those defined by the Constitution,
the elevation of the standard of living and the redistribution of income.
6. The increase in national productivity was estimated by calculating the
rate of change in real output per member of the labor force. Output
was defined as the gross internal product adjusted by the implicit
national income deflator.
7. Wage changes for the private sector were calculated from an unpublished
index of the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social, the national social
security agency .
8. Minimum wages are determined by the tripartite Consejo Nacional de
Salarios, a largely autonomous body. Minima are set on an industry-byindustry basis as well as by occupational groups within industries.
The criteria according to whfch 'minima were determined are generally
considered to have been rather vague. Beginning in 1974, however, the
central government has intervened in a more direct fashion to influence
the Consejo's decisions in line with its views on the size and form of
minimum wage adjustments. For a review of the minimum wage determination machinery and practice, see Q.F. Delgado and O.L . C. Mora, Fi ·acion,
de Salarios Mlnimos en Costa Rica, Analisis
RecomendaciDnes San Jose:
Banco Central, 1976 ; Helen I. Lorn, Salarios Mlnimos en Costa Rica (San
Jose; Universidad de Costa Rica, 1975); Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad
Social, "Antecedentes para una Politica Nacional de Salarios en Costa Rica",
(San Jose: 1974) Mimeo.
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14.
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In fact, remuneration levels in the central government lagged behind those
in the private sector between 1971 and 1975 while those in the autonomous
agencies led. During my field work in Costa Rica in 1976, various government authorities expressed concern over the central government's inability
to establish control over the wage policies pursued by the autonomous
agencies. The latter were viewed as having potential (undesirable) spillover effects and as upsetting established wage structure relationships
both vis-a-vis the rest of the public sector and the private.
The national unemployment rate as reported in the censuses of 1963 and
1973 was 6.9 and 7.3 respectively. It is of interest to note that despite
a significant rural-urban shift in population in the inter-censal period
it did not appear to have brought with it aggravated problems of unemployment in urban areas. For example, the unemployment rate in the country's
capital and largest city, San Jose, was lower than the national rate in
the 1973 census year, 6.6 percent as compared to 7.3 percent. Furthermore, a household labor force survey inaugurated in 1976 reported that
open unemployment in that year had declined since the census year to 5.1
percent in May and 6 percent in July. Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad
Social, Direccion General de Planificacion del Trabajo y el Empleo, "Encuesta de Hogares en el Area Metropolitana de San Jose: Empleo y Desempleo,
Adelanto de las Infomaciones mas Importantes,1I (May, 1976) and Encuesta
Nacional de Hogares: Empleo y Desempleo, Julio, 1976.
Q.F. Delgado and O.L. Mora, OPe cit. For a sample of rates of change in
minimum wages since 1954, see pp. 12-16.
This statement implicitely assumes that the degree of evasion of legal
minima remained constant over time. If the degree of evas ion declined,
the actural differential would be narrower than that implied by a comparison of urban earnings and agricultural minima. One of the difficulties in assessing the relation of legal minima to the market price of
labor in agriculture arises out of the variation in the latter over
various seasons of the year. While the minimum may lie above the market
wage during some parts of the year, at other, such as the harvest,
wages may be bid up above the minimum levels. For example , during the
coffee harvest of 1976 when coffee prices were at very high levels,
shortages of labor were said to be commonplace and wages were being
offered which exceeded the legal minima.
00. cit .~ pp . 16-23.
The two wages chosen for this exercise were the highest minimum wage to
which the 41 percent increase was applied and the lowest minimum to which
the 10 percent increase was applied in 1974.
The changes in the real minimum wage were computed as follows. The
average real value of the minimum wage during the base period during which
that wage was in force was computed, October 1970- September 1972. Then
the real value in February 1976 was computed, i.e., for the month after
the latest adjustment in minimum wages became effective .
Victor Hugo Cespedes S., Costa Rica: La Distribucion del In reso el
Consume de Algunos Alimentos.
San Jos
IECES. Unlversldad de Costa
Rica, 1973).
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The official - exchange rate in 1971 was

~6 . 64

17.

Ibid . , Table 9, p. 51.
to U. s. $1.

18.

Recall that the average income of these two sets of rural families is
virtually identical. The reader is cautioned to keep in mind that when
I speak of "agricultural" or "non-agricultural" families, I am referring
to families headed by a person employed in the agricultural or nonagricu l tural sector. The less precise expression is used to simplify
the textual presentation .
.

19 .

Ibid . , Appendix Table 2, p. 112. However, the reader is cautioned that
even an identical pattern in the distribution of fam i ly income in these
two employment categories could mask substanti al differences in the
earnings of the heads of families so employed . A s i milar family income distribution could result even i f earnings in self-employment were
much l ower than i n wage employment as l ong as t here was a systematic
tendency for secondary earners in the families of the self-employed to
earn more t han secondary i ncome recipi ents in familes headed by wage
earners. However, this would seem to be an unreasonab l e event to assume .

20. The i nverse relationship between family i ncome and f ami ly size was inferred from data of per capita income and fam i ly s ize presented in Table
16 (p. 64) of Cespedes· study.
21.

Ibid., Table 9, p. 51.

22 .

Censo de Poblacion 1973, Volume 2, Table 69 , p. 520.

23 .

Instituto de Fomento y Asesorla Municipal (I FPJ.1) , Anali sis Comparativo
de Tres Regiones Perifericas sobre Produccio'n Agropecuaria, Empleo,
Ingresos y Ni graci o'n, 1975.

24 . This would assume that short hours are not a result of personal choice
among workers and that they would be available if more hours of work
were offered.
25 . The inverse relationship between family income and number of household
members which Cespedes reported must be due to a ve ry strong tendency
in this direction among rural households which overcomes the urban
pattern which we have observed here . Unfortunately, Cespedes does not
provide an urban-rural breakdown so that this presumption mi ght be
tested.
26.

This paper has implicite1y assumed throughout that the only significant
institutional source of influence on wages lies in the government·s
administration of minimum wages. It has thus ignored other possible
non-market forces such as collective bargaining wh i ch might have intervened effectively. In fact, the omission of trade unions from consideration as a significant force stems from the wide consensus I found
in Costa Rica that they are not particularly powerful and do not represent a significant independent influence on wage levels except perhaps
in some of the semi-autonomous public corporations.
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27.

A prime example of an instrument with a significant redistributive
potential which could also be efficient in discriminating among different degrees of poverty and addressing its benefits only to those
deemed worthy of increases in income, is the Programa de Asignaciones
Familiares (Program of Family Allowances). The program provides a
very substantial fund, amounting to approximately 2 percent of national income, to be used to redress the distribution of income.
Were the whole fund to reach the poorest quintile of the income distribution, this could imply an increase in average incomes within that
quintile of from 33 to 40 percent . Whether the funds will actually
reach the poorest elements of the society depends on the way in which
they are distributed. At the time of my visit, the government was contemplating the assignment of these funds to 14 government institutions
for 22 different classes of activities intended to provide disbursements in kind and services to poor communities rather than cash to poor
households. The one exception was the provision of old-age pensions to
those who could not qualify for them under the social security system.
To date, I have not seen an evaluation of the program1s redistributional
effects.
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